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TE AO MĀORI IN A "SYMPATHETIC" 
LEGAL REGIME: THE USE OF MĀORI 
CONCEPTS IN LEGISLATION  
Arnu Turvey* 
The incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation has been one of several methods the 
government has employed to acknowledge and promote Māori cultural identity and give practical 
effect to the Treaty of Waitangi within its legislative frameworks.  While legal recognition of Māori 
concepts may have appeared as a positive step towards the creation of a mutually beneficial level of 
bicultural discourse in the government's management frameworks, in practice they have been the 
source of a new set of challenges. By transplanting Māori concepts directly into legislation, Māori 
ideas must become operational parts of Western regimes; concepts which are to be recognised and 
given effect to within the decision-making processes of bodies charged with the administration of 
particular legislation as well as the courts. Drawing on Commons' observations about the nature of 
artificial selection - the process by which the meaning of ideas and language is consciously or 
subconsciously manipulated by the group in power in order to advance its own interests, it becomes 
evident that, in the context of the common law legal system, Māori concepts have become detached 
from their original purpose and meaning. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation has been one of several methods the 
government has employed to acknowledge and promote Māori cultural identity and give practical 
effect to the Treaty of Waitangi within its legislative frameworks. This process has been part of 
what Paul McHugh has described as a conscious effort by government and Māori to move from the 
embattled processes of rights recognition to reconciliation through the development of a 
"sympathetic legal regime" which "accommodates the cultural disposition" of indigenous groups.1  
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While legal recognition of Māori concepts may have appeared as a positive step towards the 
creation of a mutually beneficial level of bicultural discourse in the government's management 
frameworks, in practice they have been the source of a new set of challenges. Through the 
incorporation of traditional Māori concepts into legislation, the legal system has become entangled 
in a series of highly problematic, post-colonial issues of cultural positioning and representation. 
Māori culture is at a crucial stage of development in which important decisions must be made 
about how its traditional concepts and practices are to take form within a post-colonial world. Both 
the incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation and the interpretation and implementation of 
those concepts by the courts and relevant legal authorities have raised questions about the ability of 
Western institutions to properly consider and apply Māori concepts in a way that will promote rather 
than subvert Māori culture.  
With reference to John R Commons' concept of "artificial selection" this paper highlights the 
implications of transplanting concepts from one culture directly into the legal system of another, by 
which they are subjected to processes of selection, translation and interpretation by authorities, and 
through systems, which are based on a different world view.2    
Drawing on Commons' observations about the nature of artificial selection, and following a 
formal exercise which explores the process of legal recognition of the concept of kaitiakitanga, it 
becomes evident that, in the context of the common law legal system, Māori concepts have become 
detached from their original purpose and meaning. They have come to serve as text that takes its 
meaning from the context in which it operates, within the process of two groups of unequal power 
negotiating their respective positions in a post-colonial, political discourse. In this sense the words 
themselves have become less part of the Māori world than politicised gestures of cultural 
recognition.  
Māori concepts in legislation represent hard-won victories of claims to cultural recognition. 
However, on the basis of Commons' observations of sovereign control they may equally represent a 
further entrenchment of Crown control, one which advances deep into Māori culture. The 
government's selective recognition and interpretation of Māori concepts as a means of racial 
reconciliation can be seen in terms of the development of a legal framework which, while 
sympathetic to Māori, has also served to reinforce its monopolisation of the process of artificial 
selection. This monopolisation has undermined the authority of Māori over their own culture in 
decisions about how their own concepts should be applied in contemporary contexts. 
All this poses a difficult question for Māori in terms of taking their culture forward; whether the 
opportunities for legal recognition of important cultural concepts outweighs the risks of subjecting 
those concepts to Western decision-making processes. Of note here is cultural theorist Stuart Hall's 
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description of how the creation of a fictionalised image of a unified cultural group is necessary in 
order to facilitate that marginalised group's claims to recognition.3 Hall adds that, post-recognition, 
there is a necessary shift in focus for cultural politics. This shift involves the deconstruction of 
artificially created notions of identity, and the empowerment of the members of the group to define 
their identity on their own terms.4  
Hall's discussion (when applied to the New Zealand context  –  Hall refers to blacks in Britain), 
points to a further stage in the government-Māori relationship. The further stage is about the politics 
of representation itself. It necessitates the empowerment of Māori in decision-making processes 
which determine significant questions about how to define and apply customary concepts. 
This paper concludes that, while the current set of institutional arrangements may have been 
capable of facilitating the recognition of Māori culture in terms of common law reasoning and 
principles, developing legal frameworks which can allow Māori culture to develop on its own terms 
present a new, more subtle set of challenges. Such challenges require a more sophisticated set of 
institutional arrangements. While the exact nature of institutional reform will depend on the 
circumstances in which it is to operate, as a basic principle, a level of authority for Māori over 
decisions which affect the development of their culture is required. Rather than limited and 
politically motivated recognition of a select set of cultural concepts, legal frameworks must be 
developed which allow Māori to properly consider and provide responses to issues as they arise in 
accordance with their entire value system.  
II A "SYMPATHETIC" LEGAL REGIME 
The arguments in this article are set against a backdrop of Treaty jurisprudence and common 
law rights recognition. While this article is not directly concerned with questions about recognising 
or denying Māori rights, it is useful to outline the process of rights recognition which led to the 
legislative inclusion of Māori concepts, as it provides the context and ongoing conceptual 
framework from which this phenomenon has emerged and continues to operate.  
Paul McHugh has outlined a three-stage process of indigenous rights recognition and 
reconciliation. McHugh describes those stages in terms of a long period of rights denial which was 
followed, over the last 30 years, by a period of recognition in a judicial climate increasingly 
sensitive to indigenous common law rights based claims – "the recognition period".5  The third 
phase, to which the legislative incorporation of Māori concepts belongs, can be seen as a post-
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recognition phase. This period is defined by the challenges posed by downstream questions of how, 
once recognised, indigenous rights interact with the rights of the wider community.6 
Generally speaking, New Zealand's recognition period resulted in the re-establishment by the 
courts and Waitangi Tribunal of the fiduciary rights and obligations of the partnership entered into 
by Māori and the Crown through the Treaty of Waitangi.7 New Zealand's Treaty jurisprudence 
looked to what it saw as the essential agreement: a willing exchange, for mutual benefit, of the right 
and duty to make laws for the good of all New Zealanders (Article One – kawanatanga) with the 
obligation on the Crown to recognise and actively protect the authority of Māori over their lands, 
resources, and other taonga (Article Two – tino rangatiratanga).8   
As interpreted by the Waitangi Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, the Treaty principles provide a 
framework for the recognition and active protection of Māori culture, including its right to develop 
within an overarching system of Crown sovereignty and the rule of law.9  It became apparent, 
however, that it is beyond the powers of the courts to repair the relationship between the Crown and 
Māori. 10  It was up to the Treaty partners themselves to look for ways to address their 
responsibilities to each other. 11  The next phase of Crown-Māori relations (McHugh's post-
recognition phase) was motivated by the ideal that open dialogue and participatory management 
would allow New Zealand to move on from the conflict of rights recognition to a more harmonious 
and productive political setting.12  
Accommodating the Māori voice in legislation through specific recognition of Māori concepts, 
as well as Treaty references and the establishment of consultation provisions, became an accepted 
means through which the government looked to honour the special status of Māori as the Treaty 
partner.13 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s there came a raft of legislation which incorporated 
  
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Te Puni Kōkiri He Tirohanga o Kāwa ki te Tiriti o Waitangi: A Guide to the Principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi as expressed by the Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal (Te Puni Kōkiri, Wellington, 2001) 49-64 
and 77-105. See also Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim:Wai 22 (Department of 
Justice, Wellington, 1988) 200 for discussion of the Treaty principles.    
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10  In Te Waka Hi Ika O Te Arawa v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (HC, Wellington, 3 December 
1999) Anderson J held that "… the great issue of Māori fisheries is an inapt dispute for litigation. Its scope 
in terms of history, culture, economics, politics and policy is so great that the court, however, willing to 
assist, is an inadequate instrument for the resolution of the difficulties. The courts have tried … but a 
broader jurisprudence is required." Sourced from McHugh, above n 1, 522.        
11  McHugh, above n 1, 527. 
12  Ibid, 521. 
13  Ibid, 541. 
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requirements to act in accordance with the Treaty principles and in some cases, specific references 
to Māori cultural concepts. The Resource Management Act 1991, for example, with its references to 
wāhi tapu, kaitiakitanga and mana whenua, or Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 (which refers to 
concepts such as whangai and tikanga Māori), and the terms mauri and rahui included in settlement 
legislation.The term tikanga Māori has also been incorporated into much legislation as a means for 
recognising (in very general terms) the Māori cultural customs and practices which are relevant in a 
particular situation.14  
While these provisions promised legal recognition of Māori views, as McHugh's model of rights 
recognition demonstrates, the complexities of providing for the cultural values and practices of 
Māori, when placed side by side with the values and interests of the wider community, has been the 
basis for much conflict. The incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation and the interpretation 
of those concepts in decision-making has raised questions about the ability of Western institutions to 
properly consider and apply Māori concepts in a way that will, as the Treaty requires, actively 
protect Māori culture and allow it to develop on its own terms within an overarching framework of 
Crown sovereignty.   
III PROMOTING IDENTITY: THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL 
REPRESENTATION  
The incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation arguably goes further than other similarly 
motivated legal provisions such as requirements to consult. By transplanting Māori concepts directly 
into legislation, Māori ideas must become operational parts of Western regimes; concepts which are 
to be recognised and given effect to within the decision-making processes of bodies charged with 
the administration of particular legislation as well as the courts.  
If done properly, this is arguably the furthest the government has gone towards facilitating 
biculturalism within its legal frameworks. In practice, however, the challenges which arise in the 
proper implementation of these provisions hit a series of complex, post-colonial issues of 
representation, restructuring, and repositioning of indigenous cultures within colonially based power 
structures.  
Outside the legal system, an extensive discourse has developed around the subject of 
representing indigenous or otherwise marginalised cultures within Western cultures, for example the 
media, museums and art galleries. A major concern lies in the lack of cultural neutrality of Western 
institutions. There is an inherent problem in that any attempt to represent the image of another 
culture unavoidably builds on Eurocentric preconceptions and only serves to increase their bearing 
on other cultures.  
  
14  Tikanga Māori is recognised in s 39 of the Resource Management Act 1991 and defined by s 4 of the Te 
Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 as "Māori customary values and practices". 
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On this issue, Jamaican-born cultural theorist Stuart Hall has pointed out that recognition of 
marginalised cultural groups within Western mediums of communication necessarily involves the 
creation of a fictionalised, unified group in order to facilitate claims to representation (or cultural 
recognition).15 Consequently the values of members of that wider group are seen in simplified and 
subsequently limiting terms, defined by a constructed image of a homogenous cultural group.  
Attempts to value and reinstate the culture of marginalised groups tend to look to preserve and 
protect traditional characteristics in terms of a perceived authentic state or in terms of Hall's image 
of a positive, unified group. The construction of the idea of a wider homogeneous group of Māori 
(as opposed to tribal identity) and the representation of this group through the recognition of specific 
concepts may be seen as an example of this.  
Importantly, Hall observes that, while the development of this simplified, cultural image is a 
necessary part of the recognition and de-marginalisation of a cultural group, there is a second phase 
which moves on from claims to representation (or in this instance recognition) to the politics of 
representation itself.16  In Hall's model, which loosely echoes and further illuminates McHugh's 
third post-recognition phase, a necessary focus on the politics of representation itself occurs.17 This 
involves breaking down the fictionalised, unified group and dispelling limiting definitions of racial 
identity which define the experiences of the individuals within that group based on the perceptions 
of what is and is not an authentic aspect of that culture. The objective is for members of the group to 
freely assert their culture in the forms they choose, according to their varying sets of values and 
complex, multifaceted identities. This point is picked up again in the section on Western systems as 
agents of change (Part VII below).    
Hall's observations demonstrate what a complicated matter recognising and protecting cultural 
identity is. On this point he states:18  
Identity is not as transparent or as unproblematic as we think.  Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as 
an already established fact, which new cultural practices then represent, we should think of identity as a 
'production' which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, 
representation.       
Indeed, Māori concepts are evolutionary and dynamic. Any effort to recognise and protect 
Māori concepts raises questions about the contemporary interpretation and application of traditional 
views, beliefs and practices. Such questions include: what new forms should traditional practices 
take? What is a legitimate extension of a customary practice and how should customary principles 
  
15  Hall, above n 3, 441-445.  
16  McHugh, above n 1, 55. 
17  Hall, above n 3, 441-445. 
18  Stuart Hall "Cultural Identity and Diaspora" (1989) 36 Framework 222, 222. 
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apply to new situations in which Māori find themselves or wish to proactively pursue? These are 
extremely difficult issues which are part of any colonised culture's path of post-colonial 
reconstruction.  
Consequently, the question arises: how should Parliament and the legal system go about 
recognising Māori concepts? Should they be looking to give effect to Māori concepts by 
reproducing an authentic meaning of a term in a new context? Should the decision-makers, as Hall 
described, be looking to unearth "that which colonial experience buried and overlaid, bringing to 
light the hidden continuities it suppressed"? Or should the system enable the "on-going process of 
the production of identity"?19  
In line with the third option, the focus of commentators such as Hall has been to open up 
discussions of identity; to expose bias, assumptions and constricting definitions of culture in order to 
create an environment in which constructive discourse about the evolution of cultural identity can 
occur, unhampered by Eurocentric preconceptions of authenticity. Much of the focus of this 
discourse is aimed at reasserting the position of indigenous groups as one of authority in reclaiming 
their right to determine the direction of their cultural practices in their own terms and, as Hall 
observes, to enable the on-going production of identity.  Similarly, what is needed in the legal and 
political frameworks is not merely recognition of aspects of Māori culture within Western 
frameworks but rather a serious process of questioning and exposing the levels of underlying 
cultural bias, and of actively empowering Māori in the institutions themselves.   
IV SOVEREIGN CONTROL AND THE PROCESS OF ARTIFICIAL 
SELECTION  
Protecting and preserving Māori culture is a complicated process.  It can have profound effects 
on the cultural traditions of Māori, potentially debasing important concepts and parts of the culture 
and isolating them from their wider value and knowledge systems. Consequently, questions need to 
be asked about the level of cultural bias that exists within the current institutional structures and 
accordingly their ability to allow for the unhampered production of cultural identity within them.  
The concept of artificial selection, as developed by Commons in the early 20th century, offers 
some useful insights for examining the effects of the incorporation of Māori concepts into 
legislation. Richard Dawson in his article "Artificial Selection in Colonial New Zealand" applies, to 
the New Zealand context, Commons' concept of artificial selection to show how words and customs 
are subject to manipulation by the group that holds sovereign power, and who will inevitably select 
and interpret them in ways that suit the group's own values and interests.20  
  
19  Ibid. 
20  Richard Dawson "Artificial Selection in Colonial New Zealand" (1999) 7 Waikato LR 4, 4-7. 
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Richard Dawson employs Commons' theory that sovereignty is in fact a struggle for the control 
over the process of artificial selection and therefore the determination of whose principles, rules and 
values should prevail. With this, Dawson examines how, during the period from 1830 to 1880, the 
British Crown and then the settler government constructed an institutional structure designed to take 
the sovereign sanction of force from the rangatira and tohunga who had up until then controlled the 
process of artificial selection in New Zealand. In particular, based on Commons' observations about 
the function of language as a tool of negotiation, Dawson considers that the British Sovereign's 
control of the process of drafting and later interpreting the Treaty of Waitangi provides a strong 
example of artificial selection in action.21 
Commons, Dawson states, outlined the complex process by which the state is an object of 
"control and capture in regard to channelling the direction of artificial selection, that is, the 
determination of whose customs are to count and whose to perish".22 Integral to Commons' theory 
is the notion that customs evolve on the basis of conscious decisions intended to achieve favourable 
outcomes for the group in control, according to Dawson. All laws, rights and customs are changing 
practices reinforced by their continued acceptance by a community or an institution.23  
As Commons has outlined, at the political level the law-maker determines the outcomes of 
human interactions by recognising values, principles and beliefs as being valid customs or rights.24 
In this regard, Commons equates legal rights with customs, pointing out that the state, which has 
sovereign powers, creates rights on the basis of its selection of some human practices over others 
which it prefers on the basis of the outcome of those practices.25 This view rejects the positivist 
standpoint that rights have an inherent existence that it is the role of the state to detect and protect. 
When broken down to this level of personal preference the cultural values of the sovereign group 
become paramount.   
Dawson describes Commons' theory of artificial selection in the following way:26 
The contingent nature of customs often becomes apparent when they come into conflict with 
other customs following a change in circumstances such as an increase in population.  It is at this 
point of rights integration where deliberate decision-making is required over whose custom will 
count and whose will not. 
  
21  Ibid, 12. 
22  Ibid, 5.  
23  Ibid, 2. 
24  John R Commons The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1924) 299.  
25  Dawson, above n 20, 4.  
26  Ibid. 
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The position of the government in controlling artificial selection equates to a monopolisation of 
the process of selection and determination of what are deemed to be good customs and the 
elimination of what are deemed to be bad customs.27 
Once the government has recognised particular customs or rights, the courts then determine the 
outcomes of disputes that arise from the application by individuals of these customs to specific sets 
of circumstances. Both processes bring into play the underlying concepts and values of the decision-
making bodies. Commons' theory dictates that such decisions will not go against the values of the 
decision-making power. Even if they appear to be in someone else's interests (as in the case of 
recognising Māori concepts) they will fundamentally be based on a desire or political motivation of 
the power-holding group. However sympathetic the dominant group may be, its decisions will be 
determined by its own underlying principles and cultural values.  
Of particular relevance to the incorporation of Māori concepts in legislation is Commons' 
discussion of the fluid and easily influenced meaning of words. Commons states that "contests to 
control and use sovereignty for the purposes of channelling artificial selection, ultimately involve 
attempts to control and manipulate language".28 Commons rejects formalist views that words have a 
clear meaning, noting that they are part of the evolving nature of culture and change according to the 
context in which they are applied: "Words as cultural artefacts, encapsulate changing interpretations 
of experiences and values. Changes in the meanings of words are correlated with cultural change".29 
Commons goes on to state that:30   
The common law itself is only the decisions of disputes according to the prevailing customs. Between 
the multitude of competing precedents there is opportunity for judges to select, so that the common law 
changes and grows by artificial selection looking towards future consequences.  
From Commons' observations we can see that the incorporation of cultural concepts into a 
context in which one side has a monopoly over determining which terms are selected, how they are 
incorporated, and how they are to relate to other concepts and values will lead to subtle, or not so 
subtle, manipulations of the meaning of key concepts to suit the interests and underlying ideology of 
the dominant group. 31  In other words, it is impossible to be neutral when deciding outcomes 
between various interest groups, no matter how sympathetic the regime – there will always be some 
level of subjective evaluation from the dominant group.  
  
27  Ibid 
28  Commons, above n 24, 9.  
29  Ibid, 299. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
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V ARTIFICIAL SELECTION IN POST-COLONIAL NEW ZEALAND  
Dawson uses Commons' concept of artificial selection to examine how the settler government 
asserted control over the process of artificial selection in the 19th century to advance the interests of 
colonialism. This period saw tribal Māori lose nearly all influence over the process of artificial 
selection in New Zealand. In their place came the empowerment of a colonial government which, 
over the next century, pursued a line of artificial selection so radically based on its own values and 
ideas that it all but destroyed Māori cultural customs.  
In contrast to Dawson's article, this article examines how, within the period of post-colonialism 
and Māori rights reconciliation over one hundred years on, the government has attempted to 
recognise the Treaty relationship within the same institutional frameworks that once debased Māori 
interests, through strategic concessions in the artificial selection process.  
Viewed sceptically, the incorporation of Māori concepts into its legislation could be seen as the 
government accommodating Māori values in its own decision-making process in order to defuse 
growing challenges to its right to exclusive sovereignty.32 The government has not relinquished its 
position of authority in determining the outcomes of artificial selection but has made concessions to 
recognise the rights of another group within the process of determining the question: "whose custom 
will count and whose will not?"33    
The next section looks to highlight in closer detail how the government's continued control over 
the process of artificial selection affects the meaning and function of important parts of Māori 
culture. It does this by dividing the process of legal incorporation and implementation into points at 
which the law-maker and later the decision-maker must act or interpret in ways that influence the 
terms' meaning through their own preference or underlying ideology.  
A Selection      
Legal recognition of a term automatically adds new functions to its meaning. Immediately it 
becomes part of a new body of knowledge, principles and values. The type of legislation and the 
function the term or the weight it is given within that law serve to determine the concept's new role 
and significance.    
The effect of selecting certain terms over others also has implications for cultural change. 
Certain terms such as kaitiakitanga and rahui become part of the popular vocabulary of a specialist 
area of law, potentially eclipsing other relevant terms to which they are traditionally interrelated and 
limiting their effect in other areas in which they would otherwise equally apply. This selection 
process involves favouring particular aspects of a culture and carries with it loaded meaning. For 
  
32  Dawson, above n 2, 163.  
33  Commons, above n 24, 299-300.  
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example, the government is highly unlikely to select concepts that do not correspond with its own 
political objectives.  
Also relevant is the area of law into which concepts have been incorporated, for example 
whether certain Māori terms have been used more frequently in environmental and family law rather 
than property, business or criminal law. Based on a brief survey of legislative references to Māori 
concepts, the vast majority of Māori concepts appears in environmental law as well as the law 
surrounding local government.  Some appear in family law. An example is the reference to whānau 
in the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 1989. Another example, around which a 
significant amount of case law has demonstrated the tensions of cross-cultural interpretation, is 
whāngai which is used in Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, section 115. Few Māori concepts are to 
be found in commercial and criminal law, although the Te Ture Whenua Māori Land Act 1993 has 
applied Māori concepts to property law. 
B Statutory Definition   
In most instances the incorporation of a Māori concept into law has been accompanied by a 
statutory definition. While used to provide assistance to people interpreting and applying the law, 
such translations are highly problematic and often create new uncertainties. Using an English 
translation almost inevitably undermines the value of the term from the very start. The Ministry of 
Justice report Guardianship, Custody and Access: Māori Perspectives and Experiences (the Justice 
report) highlights the issues in defining meaning through cross-cultural referencing by quoting Joan 
Metge:34 
To come to grips with Māori custom law, it is necessary to recognise that Māori concepts hardly ever 
correspond exactly with those Western concepts, which they appear, on the surface, to resemble. While 
there is a degree of overlap, there are usually divergences as well. Even if the denotation – the direct 
reference – is substantially the same, the connotations are significantly different. 
The Justice report goes on to discuss the tendency to define Māori concepts in relation to Pākehā 
ones. It states that this results in "shallow explanations of Māori concepts that fail to source them in 
their own unique philosophical underpinnings."35 It goes on to state that Māori concepts do not 
exist merely as counterpoints to Western legal concepts. Rather, they are drawn from their own 
systems of knowledge, based on a different world view.36 Emphasising commonalities between 
Māori views and those of Pākehā may have been used as a means for justifying inclusion of Māori 
  
34  Joan Metge ″Commentary on Judge Durie's Custom Law″ (unpublished paper for the Law Commission, 
1996); cited in Di Pitama, George Ririnui and Ani Mikaere  Guardianship, Custody and Access: Māori 
Perspectives and Experiences (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2002) para 7.1.  
35  Di Pitama, George Ririnui and Ani Mikaere Guardianship, Custody and Access: Māori Perspectives and 
Experiences (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2002) para 7.1.  
36  Ibid. 
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interests to the wider public. This, however, involves moderating the more mystical aspects of the 
Māori world view in favour of the practical and common sense interpretations of Māori views and 
practices from a Western perspective.37  
 
The term "in accordance with tikanga Māori" has been added to the legislative definitions of 
many Māori terms to address the inadequacy of English definitions of Māori concepts. This 
contradicts the purpose of providing a definition by creating uncertainty about what tikanga Māori 
may mean in any particular circumstance. This uncertainty around a reference to the world from 
which the term is derived may, however, have the positive result of encouraging decision-makers to 
look to Māori experts for guidance on interpretation, and therefore empower Māori in the process of 
definition, if not in the decision about how that term should be applied to the facts of the case.   
This uncertainty is a major factor in the both the argument for and against the inclusion of Māori 
terms in legislation. As noted, the uncertainty of meaning can necessitate a Māori interpretation. 
However, without the decision-making model in place to allow this to occur in a formal and reliable 
way, the process is open for abuse. There are no externally obvious checks and balances on the 
process to ensure that any Māori interpretation given is culturally informed and not biased so as to 
advance the interests of an individual litigant.  
C Interpretation 
As Commons states, words are not real – "they are signs and symbols".38  Changes in the 
meaning of words correspond with cultural changes.39 The meaning of words is determined by their 
context. In the new context of the common law these words may come to mean very different things 
from what they did in the conceptual framework from which they came. These concepts have been 
transplanted from intricate systems of belief and knowledge and into complicated and politically 
driven negotiations about social relationships. 
Once incorporated into law, Māori concepts become words subject to statutory interpretation 
and defined according to the court's interpretation of what Parliament intended them to mean. 
According to Commons, objectivity of the courts is a myth designed, along with other liberalist 
theories about the free market and minimal role of the state in relation to the affairs of the 
individual, to entrench one social group's advantaged position within the law. 40  Specifically, 
 
37  An example is the Waitangi Tribunal's statement in the Manukau Report that "the Māori world view 
emphasises the primacy of nature and the need for man to tread carefully when interfering with natural laws 
and processes. But the difference is basically one of emphasis." Waitangi Tribunal Manukau Report: Wai 8 
(GP Publications, Wellington, 1985) 91. 
38  Commons. above n 24, 9.  
39  Ibid.  
40  Commons, above n 24, 347. 
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Commons states that "definition is also valuation" and that "legal definitions for the most part are 
generalisations from judicial experience".41 When rights of the wider community come up against 
the collective right of a tangata whenua group, in determining an outcome the court seeks some 
external rule that does not change with the set of habits and emotions of a particular individual 
judge:42 
But try as they may they cannot escape valuing consciously or unconsciously, by logic or habit, the 
relative importance of the human interests at stake. Every transaction is weighed at every point 
according to what is deemed to be a public purpose. 
In addition, the government's devolution of the administration of its legislative frameworks to 
more localised agencies, in particular local government, has created a degree of separation between 
itself and its Treaty partner. Consequently, while the government has at a high level recognised 
certain aspects of Māori culture, the decisions about how these rights are to apply in practice have 
been placed in the hands of another set of authorities, who must carry out their own, more limited, 
process of artificial selection. 
D Implementation 
Giving effect to Māori concepts in decision-making processes has resulted in the development 
of new practices or systems such as consultation mechanisms, advisory bodies or the appointment of 
new governance or decision-making authorities within traditional Māori frameworks. Participation 
in Western-based forms or practices has become a part of exercising (or at least protecting) Māori 
cultural concepts. These processes for expressing cultural concepts could be seen as a genuine 
extension or development of the culture itself. However, this does not hide the fact that Māori have 
been forced to adopt Western practices in order to protect (or express) their own culture.  
VI KAITIAKITANGA AS A LEGALLY CONSTRUCTED TERM  
To look at how these processes have shaped the contemporary understanding and function of 
Māori concepts, the next section uses kaitiakitanga as an example of a legislatively recognised 
concept. Kaitiakitanga is used because of its fundamental importance in the Māori world view and 
the fact that it has been incorporated into significant legislation such as the Resource Management 
Act 1991 and the Fisheries Act 1996. The term is considered in three phases: its pre-legislative 
meaning; its legislative incorporation (which is broken into the steps outlined in the section above); 
and post-recognition, where the impact of the term's legislative incorporation on its meaning and 
function within Māori culture is considered.  
  
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid, 326.  
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A Pre-legislative Meaning  
In order to examine how Māori culture and identity have changed as a response to its 
incorporation into the legal system, it is necessary to provide evidence of how the concept operated 
within a Māori world view. Margaret Mutu, as cited by Mere Roberts in Kaitiakitanga: Māori 
Perspectives on Conservation, has provided the following description of the term kaitiakitanga:43   
Kaitiaki is a word derived from the verb "tiaki" (to guard; to protect; to keep: to watch for; to wait for) – 
with the prefix "kai" denoting the doer of the action. Hence a kaitiaki can be translated as a guardian, 
and kaitiakitanga the act of guardianship.  
The concept of kaitiakitanga is inextricably linked with the wider Māori belief system which 
positions all things in a natural order according to their relationship with atua.44 As described by 
Elsdon Best, the position of kaitiaki originated with the atua children of Rangi and Papa – gods who 
had responsibilities over particular parts of the natural world. It was their responsibility to "watch 
over and promote the welfare of all things in all places, to prevent troubles of all kind, to allay all 
evil to preserve peace among all things".45  
Nganeko Minhinnick, in her paper Establishing Kaitiaki states:46 
The traditional institution of Kaitiaki does not stand alone … it is part of a complex social, cultural, 
economic, and spiritual system that has been established through long tribal associations with land and 
waters. To know Kaitiaki is to know the Māori world – the tribal structures of iwi, hapu, whanau. It is 
only from an understanding of tangatawhenua, manawhenua and ahi kaa that we can begin to appreciate 
the position of kaitiaki.      
Minhinnick's quote clearly describes the broad application and central position of the concept of 
kaitiaki in the Māori world view. It also states that to understand the concept requires a much 
broader knowledge of the complex systems from which it originates. Minhinnick adds: "The 
physical kaitiaki system is based on whakapapa (genealogy) lineage, and inherited nurtured 
responsibility as in father to son, mother to daughter, or by election, instruction and direction of 
tribal leaders."47   
  
43  Mere Roberts, Waerete Norman, Nganeko Minhinnick, Del Wihongi and Carmen Kirkwood "Kaitiakitanga: 
Māori Perspectives on Conservation" (1995) 2 Pacific Conservation Biology 7, 12 [Kaitiakitanga]. 
44  Elsdon Best Some Aspects of Māori Myth and Religion Dominion Post Monograph No 1 (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1978) 11. 
45  Ibid.  
46  Nganeko Kaihau Minhinnick Establishing Kaitiaki (Minhinnick, Auckland 1989) 1. 
47  Ibid, 4. 
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B Legislative Incorporation 
1 Selection of kaitiakitanga 
The term kaitiakitanga is used exclusively in resource management law, which is not consistent 
with its wider use in the Māori world view.48 Kaitiakitanga is used in the Resource Management 
Act 1991 (RMA) which, pursuant to section 7(a), requires decision makers to "have particular 
regard" to kaitiakitanga. 
Other legislative references include section 40(1) of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, which 
states that one of the purposes of a foreshore and seabed reserve is to "acknowledge the exercise of 
kaitiakitanga by the applicant group over the specified area of the public foreshore and seabed." The 
Fisheries Act 1996 has also incorporated kaitiakitanga. Section 4 defines it as "the exercise of 
guardianship; and, in relation to any fisheries resources, includes the ethic of stewardship based on 
the nature of the resources, as exercised by the appropriate tangata whenua in accordance with 
tikanga Māori."  
(a) Kaitiakitanga and the Resource Management Act 1991 
Kaitiakitanga was first incorporated into the RMA, along with a number of other community or 
national values, as necessary components of resource management planning and decision-making. 
These matters are given varying levels of importance. Kaitiakitanga is not included in the highest 
level, to which requires decision-makers to recognise and give effect, but as an "other matter" which 
requires decision makers to "have particular regard" to.   
Inherent in the RMA's driving concept of sustainable management is an increased level of 
devolution and participatory management which recognises that decisions about communities are 
often best made within the local context. The rise of participatory management as an inherent 
component of sustainable management is linked to wider developments in environmental 
management at a national/community level as well as internationally that arise from political claims 
to the right to share resource management power and responsibility with the state.49 The inclusion 
of the Treaty principle reference in section 8, along with the Māori specific provisions in section 
6(e) (the relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, 
waahi tapu, and other taonga) and section 7(a), kaitiakitanga was the government's way of 
recognising the Treaty relationship within its devolved management system and allowing Māori to 
have a say in environmental matters. 
  
48  Although the Waka Umanga Bill 2007 preamble refers to kaitiaki as a defining feature of Māori groups. 
49  Castro Alfonso and Erik Nielsen ″Indigenous people and co-management: implications for conflict 
management″ (2001) 4 Environmental Science and Policy 229, 232. 
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The RMA effectively shifted the burden of consultation from the government to local 
government who, in turn, has, where deemed appropriate, shifted the burden onto individual 
resource consent applicants. Tangata whenua groups have been expected to participate in highly 
complicated, time-consuming and expensive processes. While central government had passed its 
legislation on the grounds that it would ensure Māori concepts and a Māori voice were part of the 
new regime, in practice there was little provision for the complicated and resource-intensive 
processes that would be required to put this framework into place. The protection of Māori concepts 
has often been compromised as a result.50    
2 Translation of kaitiakitanga 
Section 2 of the RMA defines kaitiakitanga as "the exercise of guardianship by the tangata 
whenua of an area in accordance with tikanga Māori in relation to natural and physical resources; 
and includes the ethic of stewardship". The use of the terms "guardianship" and "the ethic of 
stewardship" in relation to tikanga Māori provides an example of Wright's observation that statutory 
definitions indicate what kind of thing the concept is, but do not "specify all the values or practices 
that it can encompass."51 
3 Interpretation of kaitiakitanga 
The legal conflict that has surrounded the implementation of the RMA's Māori provisions 
demonstrates the "rampant legalism" which, as McHugh points out, resulted from issues of rights 
integration in the post-recognition period. This said, case law only represents the rare occasion 
where a Māori group has had the necessary resources to take a decision to court. Case law does not 
account for the majority of instances where either Māori have not been involved in important 
decision-making processes or their concerns have been considered but not given effect to. The 
tendency to give more weight to the economic interests of resource consent applicants over the less 
tangible and not well-understood cultural interests of Māori is something which has occurred at both 
the local government level and in the courts. It is also not unique to Māori interests; other cultural or 
environmental values have often been outweighed by economic interests under the Act.52 
The significance of the incorporation of Māori concepts into the RMA is demonstrated by the 
pre-RMA decision Minhinnick v Waikato Valley Authority A66/84, 1984, in which the Planning 
Tribunal held that under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 "there is nothing in the Act 
which allows us to take those purely metaphysical concerns [of Māori] into account." Contrast this 
  
50  Te Puni Kōkiri Te Kotahitanga o te Whakahaere Rawa: Māori and Council Engagement Under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (Te Puni Kōkiri, Wellington, 2006) 13 [Te Puni Kōkiri]. 
51  Fiona Wright "Law, Religion and Tikanga Maori" (2007) NZJPIL 261. 
52  David Young Values as Law: The History and Efficacy of the Resource Management Act (Institute of Policy 
Studies Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 2001) 32.   
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with the interpretation of kaitiakitanga in the RMA by Chambers J in Auckland Regional Council v 
Arrigato Investments Ltd: McDonald v Arrigato Investments Ltd,53 who held that, since Parliament 
had chosen to express section 7(a) of the RMA with a Māori term, the Māori understanding of that 
term must be paramount. However, it was also considered important that non-Māori speakers be 
able to understand the concept by the use of appropriate English terminology.  
The incorporation of the concept of kaitiakitanga as well as the matters in section 6(e) in the 
RMA has now made it clear that the courts may consider the spiritual or metaphysical aspects of 
Māori culture. As the following decisions demonstrate, the courts, under the RMA, have 
accordingly been willing to consider Māori spiritual and cultural values along with those of the 
wider community and, at times, have made significant decisions in favour of their protection. But 
the decisions have demonstrated a tendency of the courts to avoid directly considering the concepts' 
specific meanings, instead applying them in general terms. For example, there seems to be little 
distinction in judicial decisions between the application of the concept of kaitiakitanga to the more 
specific provisions in section 6(e). 
The judges in decisions such as those of the Court of Appeal in Watercare Services Ltd v 
Minhinnick 54  and the High Court in Ngāti Maru v Kruithof and Thames Coromandel District 
Council 55  have looked to develop reasoning and tests for considering Māori culturally-based 
objections by applying common law concepts such as proportionality and objectivity as standard 
tests. Decisions on the Māori provisions tend to be based on matters of process (for example 
whether sufficient consultation has occurred) and reliability of evidence rather than on 
considerations of the meaning of the Māori concepts themselves.   
In Watercare Services v Minhinnick the Court of Appeal approved of the Environment Court's 
use of a "reasonable Māori person representative of the community at large" test to determine 
whether Minhinnick's objection to the construction of a sewerage pipeline which travelled over wahi 
tapu was offensive to such an extent that it would have an adverse effect sufficient to outweigh the 
values of the community as a whole:56 
The court must weigh all the relevant competing considerations and ultimately make a value judgment 
on behalf of the community as a whole. … the court, as the representative of New Zealand society as a 
whole, decides whether the subject matter is offensive or objectionable under s314.  In the end a 
balanced judgment has to be made.    
  
53  Auckland Regional Council v Arrigato Investments Ltd: McDonald v Arrigato Investments Ltd (14 
September 2000) HC Auckland AP138/99 & M126-SW00. 
54  Watercare Services Ltd v Minhinnick [1998] 1 NZLR 294 (CA). 
55  Ngāti Maru v Kruithof and Thames Coromandel District Council (30 July 2004) HC, Hamilton, CIV 2004-
485-330.  
56  Watercare Services Ltd v Minhinnick [1998] 1 NZLR 294 (CA) 305.  
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In light of Commons' commentary on the judiciary's claim to objectivity, this ruling provides an 
example of a Western body legitimising its own value system as the test for interpreting a Māori 
concept. Accordingly, Māori concerns are to be considered within a sympathetic regime, but it is the 
role of an authority with little understanding of a Māori perspective to rule on whether or not the 
proposed activity is sufficiently objectionable to what it interprets to be a reasonable representative 
of the Māori community. The court is free to consider Māori interests along with any number of 
other interests and rule according to its own assessment of the values at stake. 
In the examples given, the courts have shown a reluctance to provide definitive interpretations 
of Māori concepts, relying more on questions of process and tests of reasonableness. While legal 
recognition has allowed the court to consider the spiritual and intangible cultural effects of a 
proposed activity, in making this consideration the courts have often applied the concept of 
kaitiakitanga along with the other Māori concepts in the RMA in a vague, generalised manner. This 
indicates that the significance of these concepts within the RMA regime has become less in the 
terms of their original meaning than as symbols of, and tools for, a broader reconciliatory dialogue.  
4 Implementation of kaitiakitanga  
There are examples of the RMA's Māori-specific provisions working well in terms of 
established relationships between local government and groups. 57  However, by and large the 
requirements of participation in planning or resource consent decision-making have presented 
considerable problems for tangata whenua groups and the agencies they were to engage with. As 
McHugh states, "the RMA created a consultation regime into which Māori were drawn, like it or 
not".58 
Protection of cultural values including kaitiakitanga requires a new level of expertise from both 
Māori and local government. Issues of governance, representation, capacity, and capability have 
frequently undermined Māori participation in processes that have direct effects on their values. 
Local governments that have taken their legislative responsibilities to Māori seriously have also 
struggled with the task of consulting with Māori. The consequence is that advocacy for kaitiakitanga 
is not as strong many other non-Māori interests.59   
B Post Recognition Meaning: The Effect on Māori Culture  
As Cate Poynton states "language constitutes context as well as simultaneously being 
constituted by it".60 In the context of the legal frameworks into which these concepts have been 
  
57  Te Puni Kōkiri, above n 50.  
58  McHugh, above n 1, 511. 
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transplanted, these words have come to take on meanings of their own. Whether these new 
meanings and functions have replaced the pre-legislative meanings, whether the traditional 
meanings still operate alongside these new forms, or whether these concepts have been 
fundamentally altered as part of a wider post-colonial process in the restructuring of Māori cultural 
identity through adaptation to new contexts are open-ended and culture-defining questions for 
Māori. On this point, however, Minhinnick states that these terms should be flexible and that it is 
the underlying intentions which determine whether an act or process is a valid form of 
kaitiakitanga:61 
Concepts should be flexible, they are essentially about exercising mana, which has been bestowed upon 
the kaitiaki (as opposed to self proclaimed) to act as a guardian of something which will ensure its 
health and the appropriate balance of a natural harmony and hierarchy. So whether it be through 
litigating in the Environment Court or through more traditional means if a person who has the mandate 
to act is acting with the same set of intentions about ensuring the health and balance of a system it is a 
genuine expression of kaitiakitanga. 
While it is difficult to determine the precise effects of the inclusion of Māori concepts in 
legislation on the original concept, it is possible to observe that concepts such as kaitaikitanga have 
undergone significant transformations in the face of legal recognition. As discussed, the concepts 
have acquired new meaning less in terms of their traditional cultural values than as mechanisms for 
facilitating the recognition of Māori interests more broadly. The terms have picked up new means of 
expression and have become loaded with the baggage of their particular legal framework. 
Furthermore, in interpretation the concepts have been subject to the courts' creation of a "reasonable 
Māori person". 
VII WESTERN SYSTEMS AS AGENTS FOR CHANGE 
Māori must decide whether the inclusion of their culture into legal systems which subjects it to 
non-Māori decision-making authorities is a positive move. This is not a new question for Māori. In 
the face of colonisation, but even more so now in post-colonialism, Māori have been forced to make 
important decisions about how to promote their culture and identity and whether to use the same 
institutions that once so effectively undermined those cultural traditions. Paul McHugh describes the 
significance of these decisions:62 
The enduring paradox that aboriginal people faced as they confronted the constitutional system of the 
settler-state after the war: the more they rejected the outcome of colonialism (its victim hood especially), 
the more they co-opted (and adapted) key elements of it, such as (most notably) its legalism. For some 
this was not necessarily a negative as an energizing series of choices in keeping with their history of 
  
61  Kaitiakitanga, above n 43, 12.  
62  McHugh, above n 1, 56. 
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adaptation and innovation.  For others even to talk the language of rights was the antithesis of their 
aboriginal identity. Part of their own mental colonisation.  
Some commentators have criticised moves by government to incorporate the Treaty principles 
into its frameworks as merely consolidations of current institutional power. Dawson quotes Jane 
Kelsey as describing the victories of the recognition period as containing the "seeds of long term 
defeat"63 in that, by accepting the Crown's watered-down interpretation of the Treaty, the Crown 
has been allowed to subdue the growing revolt against its complete control of sovereignty.64 The 
inclusion of Māori concepts in legislation, like the Treaty principles, would likely be seen by Kelsey 
as part of the government's evasion of the conflict between kawanatanga and tino rangatiratanga and 
the "subordination of Mana Māori to absolute Crown authority".65   
But for many Māori, the development of a "sympathetic" legal regime has been the result of 
hard-won battles, be it as they may, fought within the institutions and rules of the English common 
law. The legalism that characterised the period of rights recognition, while motivated by the feelings 
of loss, resentment and anger towards the authorities that had denied their status and the Treaty, 
demonstrated an ongoing willingness from Māori to utilise the opportunities offered by the same 
system that had taken them away.  
There is a strong history of cooperation for mutual advantage in the Māori–government 
relationship.  The incorporation of Māori concepts into the law can be seen as a continuation of a 
number of strategic initiatives on the part of Māori to appropriate Western systems to advance their 
own cultural values – the Kingitanga, the Māori Parliament and even the Treaty itself have 
demonstrated this.  
Equally, it is important to note that Māori, some of whom are closely integrated within the 
government's legal and political institutions, have not been silent voices in these decision-making 
processes. The incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation is a strong example of a conscious 
decision by Māori and the government to work towards the recognition and promotion of Māori 
culture for mutual benefit.  From this perspective, working within Western frameworks to advance 
Māori culture can be seen as a rational response to the realities of cohabitation and even a valid 
extension of cultural identity. Richard Boast quotes Richard White as stating that, "contact was not a 
battle of primal forces in which only one could survive. Something new could appear".66  
  
63  "The Treaty of Waitangi and the Control of Language", above n 2, 165. 
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The question we come back to then is whether the systems and frameworks into which Māori 
concepts have been incorporated are capable of allowing, in Hall's words, for the "on-going 
production"67 of cultural identity in terms of the Treaty guarantee of tino rangatiratanga. Or is the 
use of legal systems, no matter how sympathetic, doomed to only reinforce non-Māori authority 
over the process of artificial selection? 
IX INSTITUTIONAL REFORM  
Dawson says that Brookfield has argued that the current institutional framework is capable of 
giving effect to the Treaty and bicultural values, if those values were to be properly entrenched:68  
Let the Constitution make clear, through the entrenchment of the Treaty, the bicultural values that are to 
be protected, and the lawyers will serve those values well, as indeed they already do, Māori and Pākehā 
judges and lawyers alike on the Waitangi Tribunal. 
But Dawson also says that Commons theories highlight that, even if the Treaty was entrenched, 
there is an inevitable subjectivity in determining how it would be applied. The issue of control of 
sovereignty cannot be that easily overlooked: "The state is a human artefact – something which 
individuals and groups endeavour to control to ensure, among other things, the survival of what they 
deem to be good customs".69        
Placing Western-based decision-making bodies in positions of control over the process of 
artificial selection in which they determine culturally significant questions without a complete 
understanding of the significance of what they are deciding means attempts to define Māori 
concepts in practical terms so as to give effect to them in decision-making processes can dilute, 
distort and debase them.  
As discussed earlier in this article, Stuart Hall has observed that the development of a simplified, 
cultural image is a necessary part of the recognition and de-marginalisation of a cultural group. Hall 
has, however, also pointed to a second phase which moves on from the process of recognition to the 
politics of representation and the deconstruction of limiting definitions of racial identity.70  The 
objective is for members of the group to freely assert their culture in the forms they choose (to 
enable a production of identity), according to their varying sets of values and complex, multifaceted 
identities. In order for this to happen, Māori need to be in a position of power in determining how 
their culture is recognised and interpreted. Moreover, there need to be effective institutional 
frameworks which allow Māori to exercise that power.  
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Hekia Parata has commented that Māori sovereignty as guaranteed by Article Two of the Treaty 
is about restoring iwi decision-making.71 This does not preclude individual Māori from making 
personal decisions, nor does it preclude the government from making laws as the overall national 
framework. It is about the constitutional rights and status of tribes within New Zealand society 
which in part comprises "the right to control things of importance to them".72 Parata goes on to state 
sovereignty can be expressed in different ways based on the context: 73 
Cultural sovereignty is ownership and control of those characteristics which reflect your culture and 
keep it alive – like language, value systems and institutions such as the marae and the whanau. 
Māori have indicated a willingness to be part of an inclusive system which, while governed by a 
majority of non-Māori, respects and will endeavour to protect and promote their culture in 
accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi. However, without the type of change based on the 
recognition of cultural sovereignty, as discussed by Parata, which gives Māori a greater level of 
ownership and control of the process of artificial selection, legislative recognition of Māori concepts 
will inevitably result in falsely constructed representations of Māori culture.  
While this article has not delved into the options for institutional change (and in any case new 
institutional arrangements will depend on the context it is to operate within) as a basic principle for 
any institutional reform, it is evident that an institutional structure is needed which allows Māori to 
respond to issues as they arise on their own terms. In its report Delivering Justice for All the Law 
Commission recommends that "Pākehā law needs to recognise the autonomy of Māori customs and 
establish an iwi led decision making process to operate within its legislative frameworks".74   
The level of autonomy suggested in the Law Commission's recommended model would help 
address the key issues of influence from government within the process of artificial selection. The 
question of how Māori interests interact with those of the wider community would, however, still be 
left open to some extent. This may be an inevitable reality – it is inevitable that some compromises 
to Māori interests are necessary, as is the case with any societal group. What is important is that 
Māori have a level of authority in determining what those compromises are. If that is done, then the 
law is successfully enabling the production of identity, as opposed to undermining the process of 
cultural evolution by reinforcing non-Māori ideas about what Māori culture should look like.   
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VIII CONCLUSION  
There are important processes of cultural restructuring for Māori in post-colonial New Zealand 
that require decision-making about which customs continue and what form they take. The 
incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation, while appearing to capture and promote traditional 
concepts central to Māori identity, has in fact exposed these concepts to processes of selection, 
interpretation and implementation by Western authorities with little understanding of the systems 
from which the terms originate.  
The continued monopoly of the government and its agencies over the process of what Commons 
has described as artificial selection  means  that these concepts in the context of the common law, 
rather than promoting Māori culture, are being interpreted in accordance with the underlying values 
and interests of the dominant group. The meaning of the terms themselves becomes subservient to 
the political objectives of a government which, while sympathetic to Māori interests, is determined 
to steer away from the underlying questions of tino rangatiratanga.  
Stuart Hall has observed that the construction of a fictional image of a unified cultural group 
which is defined in terms of cross-cultural references to the dominant culture is a necessary part of 
the recognition or recentralisation of marginalised groups.75 Recognition of Māori concepts which 
build on a conception of Māori culture as a homogenous group with a set of standard, definable 
values or concepts is an example of this necessary but flawed process. Hall has observed that the 
next step in the process of genuine recognition of marginalised culture is the politics of 
representation itself. This involves breaking down preconceived and limiting representations of 
identity, and provides a useful indication of where the focus of Māori – government relations in 
McHugh's post recognition phase needs to head.   
Rather than aiming to protect artificially selected concepts of Māori culture, there is a need to 
establish a framework which allows for Māori culture to be expressed and to develop in a way that 
recognises the complex nature of Māori identity. It must give Māori the power to determine how to 
respond to various issues and circumstances within new contexts.  
 
 
 
 
75  Hall, above n 3, 441-445. 
